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Abstract
This article identifies the colonial imperative of ‘we must develop them, with or without their 
consent’, which is used by the Indian state in order to dominate Kashmiri Muslims, and 
argues that this notion of development combines patriarchal silencing of the subjugated as 
well as a gendered fantasy of liberating oppressed Kashmiri women and minorities. While 
the colonial nature of Indian rule over Kashmir has been a long-term phenomenon, the 
focus in this article will primarily be on a specific political transformation imposed by the 
Indian state since August 2019, when even the pretence of autonomy and recognition was 
given up, and all phenomena constituting coloniality became conspicuous and acute. 
Adopting a feminist lens, I highlight nine features of contemporary Indian coloniality in 
Kashmir – denial of consent, paternalism, violence, enforced silencing, lack of 
accountability, arbitrariness, divide and rule, humiliation, and a specious idea of 
development. I further argue that such a notion of coloniality as development, is better 
understood as Econonationalism (akin to homonationalism and femonationalism) where 
the supposed liberatory ideas are rhetorically deployed to mask a dehumanising 
subjugation.
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“For it is not true that there are some good colons [fn] and others who are wicked. There 
are colons and that is it”. 
[Sartre, 2001 [1964/1956], p. 32] 
Postcolonial and decolonial scholars have contributed to a vast literature interrogating the 
dynamics of imperial-colonial projects, often with an exclusive focus on the impacts of 
European colonialisms on large parts of Asia, Africa, and the Americas (Bhambra, 2014). 
However, this prodigious criticality has not been adequately brought to bear upon the 
actions of the formerly colonised states in the non-West as they have often sought to 
recreate the colonial theatres in their own peripheries. When it comes to Indian-
administered Kashmir, the multifaceted violence of the Indian state towards Kashmir 
cannot be subsumed away in the name of India being a non-Western post-colonial entity. 
India’s actions in Kashmir were not seen as colonial because India itself had been 
colonized. However, colonialism is not exclusively a Western prerogative, and the ‘moral 
wound of colonialism’ has been weaponized by formerly colonized states to deny their own 
colonialism (Kaul, 2020)
Like patriarchy with its implicit and explicit assumptions and practices that reinforce 
systemic gendered inequities, colonialism, whether formally or informally enacted, carries 
within it an assumed moral superiority and economic rationality. Paternalism and violent 
policing of behaviour of the subjugated go hand in hand. The territorial dimension of 
colonial rule is anchored by using the techniques of military occupation and bureaucratic 
control to deny a subjugated population their political aspirations for freedom or self-rule. 
In each of these senses, the Kashmiri population in Jammu and Kashmir, with a focus on 
Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley under Indian control, has been subjected to a long-running 
exercise of power that is colonial. 
With every passing year, as democratic rights come to mean much less in India,1 the usual 
rationales given for why power is exercised in this way by the Indian state upon Kashmiris, 
wear thin. India’s rule should be understood as “the masculinist patriarchal bureaucratic 
governmentality of a postcolonial emerging power with hubris that seeks to 
uncompromisingly possess Kashmir” (Kaul 2018, 138). Coloniality involves feminisation 
(Nandy 1983) as well as hyper-masculinisation of the colonized bodies with the purpose of 
legitimizing control, and we have witnessed a rapid acceleration of this in recent months in 
Indian-administered Kashmir. Kashmiri female bodies are projected as beautiful, fragile, 
and vulnerable to victimisation by hyper-masculine Kashmiri-Muslim patriarchy, thus 
calling for being ‘saved’ by not only the progressive feminist Indians, but also by, rather 
than from, Indian masculinist nation-state. 
This article identifies the colonial imperative of ‘we must develop them with or without their 
consent’ that is used by the Indian state in order to dominate Kashmiri Muslims, and 
argues that this notion of development combines patriarchal silencing of the subjugated as 
1 State repression of protests against the 2019 Citizenship Act Amendment (CAA) and 
National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the 2020 Farm Laws have seen the Indian state 
actively use sedition laws against dissent while right-wing vigilante attacks on protesters 
and on several universities in India have gone unchecked.
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well as a gendered fantasy of liberating oppressed Kashmiri women and minorities. While 
the colonial nature of Indian rule over Kashmir has been a long-term phenomenon, the 
focus in this article will primarily be on a specific political transformation imposed by the 
Indian state since August 2019, when even the pretence of autonomy and recognition was 
given up, and all phenomena constituting coloniality became conspicuous and acute. 
Adopting a feminist lens, I highlight nine features of contemporary Indian coloniality in 
Kashmir – denial of consent, paternalism, violence, enforced silencing, lack of 
accountability, arbitrariness, divide and rule, humiliation, and a specious idea of 
development. I further argue that such a notion of coloniality as development, is better 
understood as Econonationalism (akin to homonationalism and femonationalism) where 
the supposed liberatory ideas are rhetorically deployed to mask a dehumanising 
subjugation.
August 5, 2019 – The Constitutional Coup and Aftermath
Until 5 August 2019, Indian administered Kashmir (known as Jammu and Kashmir or J&K 
under the Indian Constitution) had de jure autonomous statehood through provisions of the 
Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Both the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy and 
the statehood was abolished on 5 August -- through what should be called a ‘constitutional 
coup’ -- without any consultation with, or consent from, any Kashmiris in any capacity (see 
Kaul, 2019a, Chatterji, 2019). Immediately prior to this fateful morning, tens of thousands 
of extra troops were brought into the already heavily militarised Kashmir Valley from India, 
and tourists and pilgrims were advised to leave. 
Discarding the substance and rationale of the constitutional provisions and guarantees — 
through a baffling series of legal machinations that have been the subject of critiques by 
many expert lawyers — the Indian Parliament arrogated to itself the power and ability to 
act to make these changes in lieu of the J&K state legislature. Through this, the 
constitutional autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir state was taken away, it was 
simultaneously bifurcated and converted from being a state to becoming two union 
territories (Ladakh being one, and Jammu and Kashmir the other) to be directly 
administered from the centre.
As this was enacted and the special status plus statehood of Jammu and Kashmir was 
dismantled, a telecommunications ban covering internet, landline, mobile and text services 
was imposed upon the region. In addition, curfews came into force, with Section 1442 
being used to prevent people from gathering anywhere. Political leaders from across the 
ideological spectrum were placed under indefinite house arrests or detentions. Hundreds 
of members of civil society including academics, teachers, business persons were 
arrested. An unverifiably large number of young persons, including children as young as 
nine years old, were detained, arrested, and some sent off to prisons in far off places in 
India. No-fly lists were prepared for hundreds of Kashmiri individuals, and prominent 
former bureaucrats and journalists were prevented from leaving the region. Any 
relaxations in communication since then have been piecemeal and restricted, and in some 
cases, conditional, such as release from detention upon signing bonds to confirm that the 
individuals will not be speaking to the media (The Wire, 2019a, Kathju, 2019). The internet 
shutdown continued into 2020, making this the longest ever such instance in any 
2 Section 144 is a colonial-era law which prohibits assembly of people. It is routinely used 
in Kashmir. 
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democracy worldwide.3 Even as the Coronavirus pandemic began and the flow of 
information became essential for saving lives, only limited communication was initially 
restored. 
This Constitutional Coup of 5 August 2019 is the apotheosis of what can be described best 
as the colonial exercise of power by India in Kashmir. To those who are familiar with the 
history and politics of the region, the most striking aspect of August 2019 is not the 
changes to Article 370 or the telecommunications ban per se. These moves are certainly 
draconian, but they represent the acceleration and deepening of what is a long-standing 
unaccountable exercise of power with legal impunity in a most militarised zone of 
occupation. The autonomy guaranteed under article 370 had already been eroded 
substantially over time. What is perhaps most striking about what was done to Kashmir in 
August 2019 and its aftermath is the unmasking of a coloniality, clearly recognisable 
through substantive changes in residency laws, land ownership, environmental 
regulations, and demography, even as it seeks to disguise itself under the liberation 
rationale of empowering women and other marginalised identities and ushering in 
‘development’ for all.
Features of Contemporary Indian Coloniality in Kashmir: A Feminist Lens
With the events of August 2019, a turning point was marked, which unmistakably 
highlighted the resonance of colonial rule. It is helpful to adopt a feminist lens and identify 
the similarities this colonial rule has with patriarchy and rape culture where rape is 
recognised not as an exceptional sexual act but a product of systemic assertion of power 
normalised through marshalling of gendered and sexualised violent language and 
practices. Adopting a feminist lens, here I make nine observations on contemporary India’s 
assertion of coloniality over Kashmir.
Firstly, there is a denial of consent. The consent of any Kashmiri individual or collective 
constitutional or legal or civic body in Jammu and Kashmir was deemed irrelevant to what 
was imposed upon them as fait accompli, notwithstanding the claim of India to be a 
democracy.4 Patriarchy under-emphasises rape and sexual violence by making women 
subordinate to, and in proprietorial relations with, men. Coloniality is about reinforcing of 
asymmetrical power relations and denial of agency to the colonised in how they are 
governed. Consent is not deemed necessary because it is the patriarch/coloniser who is 
the ‘owner’/ ‘care taker’ of the feminised Other/colonised. In the unilateral ending of de jure 
autonomous statehood, Indian state showed no desire to seek consent of people directly 
affected. 
Secondly, there is paternalism where all measures are justified as being for the good of 
ordinary people. Indian PM Modi, in one of his first speeches after announcing the end of 
the autonomous statehood, promised: ‘There will be a lot of development…All the citizens 
will be given their rights’ (BBC, 2019a). Indian government ministers and ruling party 
leaders constantly referred to ‘women, youth, minorities, marginalised caste and tribal 
3 Globally, India ranks highly in enforcing internet censorship; Jammu and Kashmir 
experienced 193 occasions of internet blocks since 2016 (see Scroll, 2019a). 1 million 
tweets referencing Kashmir were deleted at the request of the Indian government in the 
last two years (Haddad, 2019). 
4 Only right-wing pro-hindutva Kashmiri Pandit groups outside of Kashmir valley supported 
this move.
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groups’ as being on their side and only a handful of ‘elite’ on the other side opposing the 
government. The Indian state, through its constitutional coup, reasserted itself as the 
patriarch who cares (for a detailed government justification for its action on 5 August, see 
The Hindu, 2019). The patriarch is represented as the one with privileges that stem from 
their ‘duty of care’ as the ‘head of the household’; they have the authority to shape, decide 
or dictate the lives on the others because they supposedly know what is best. In fact, the 
patriarch is often projected as sacrificing their own energies to take care of the ‘family’ 
through a mix of love and the iron fist. Likewise, India is represented as ‘sacrificing’ its 
security personnel and taking the ‘burden of helping’ the ingrate Kashmiris (Kapoor, 2019). 
Thirdly, there is no let-up in militarisation in Kashmir; in fact, there is heavier militarisation 
in ‘the world’s most militarised zone’. Violence is integral to colonisation in the same way 
that it is integral to sustaining a patriarchal rape culture where it is useful to ‘show resistant 
bodies their place’, ‘to teach a lesson’, ‘to police behaviour’, and to instil respect through 
fear. Tens of thousands of extra troops were sent, newer barricades came up, severe 
restrictions on gatherings and public assembly were imposed, and curfew became a 
renewed part of everyday life. All the denials of rights were presented by the Indian state 
as necessary measures to ‘secure’ Kashmir. This ‘securing’ of Kashmir for India by 
brutalising, dehumanising, and insecuring the Kashmiris was seen in India as an example 
of Modi-led Hindu nationalist government’s strong and ‘muscular’ approach. 
Cisheteromasculinity depends on the use of violence to police the boundaries of gender 
and sexuality, and coloniality depends on the use of violence to police the colonised 
bodies. The Indian patriarchal state uses all forms of violence – systemic, quotidian, 
exceptional, direct, indirect, epistemic – to try and make Kashmiris accept Indian colonial 
occupation as normal. These forms include arbitrary detention, pellet-blinding, torture, 
enforced disappearance, sexual violence, rape, and judicial as well as extra-judicial 
killings.5 
Fourthly, there is enforced silencing. No expression of dissent is permissible. Such 
enforced silencing that raises the cost of speaking out is integral to patriarchal rape culture 
where the system functions by making it difficult or costly for the victims to speak up. 
Colonial occupation too functions by silencing the body politic. In post-August 2019 
Jammu and Kashmir, public dissent of any Kashmiri individual or collective constitutional 
or legal or civic body is not allowed, notwithstanding the crucial role of, and right to, dissent 
(even peacefully) in democratic functioning. Politicians, doctors, journalists, civil society 
activists, and the ordinary public are all gagged and/or face intimidation from the State. 
Fifthly, there is no democratic accountability. The perpetrators of physical and symbolic 
violence act with impunity knowing that the legal and bureaucratic apparatuses work in 
their favour. For a significant amount of time, the Supreme Court of India delayed hearing 
petitions on the momentous changes that amounted to a collective punishment of the 
Kashmiri population, thus supporting the government’s move directly and indirectly through 
a refusal to immediately require the government to furnish a rationale for their actions. 
Under the byline ‘state of disgrace’, The Economist (2019) published an explicit exposure 
of this in an article: “India’s judges are ignoring the government’s abuses in Kashmir”. Over 
5 See various reports on violence and human rights abuses at https://jkccs.net/ and 
https://apdpkashmir.com/ Even in stark cases of mass rape of girls and women by armed 
forces such as in the villages of Kunan Poshpora, justice was not served (see Batool et al., 
2016).
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the decades, Kashmir has been treated as a ‘state of exception’ (Duschinski, 2010, 
Hassan, 2018). 
Sixthly, there is a related arbitrariness in how the state decides upon punitive actions and 
also provides selective respite. With the emergency powers (for instance, Armed Forces 
Special Powers Act and the Public Safety Act) already in force for decades in Kashmir, 
there is an institutionalised regime of impunity. This lack of accountability is further 
enhanced when the state arbitrarily decides to place a blanket ban on communications, 
then at different times of its own choosing, temporarily lifts some restrictions for some 
groups of people; any democratic rights that ought to derive from law become an 
instrument of manipulation delivered whimsically as an exercise of largesse. 
Seventhly, there is a divide and rule strategy. As part of the patriarchal rape culture, there 
is a distinction made between ‘ideal victim’ and the rest who have to suffer their 
experience of being trivialised/ignored/erased; between ‘good women’ and ‘bad women’. 
Similarly, under the colonial setup, the distinction is made between noble and ignoble 
natives. The entire Kashmir scenario is emphatically stamped with divide et impera; the 
tactic is evident both in the proximate act of bifurcating Jammu and Kashmir to create two 
union territories with ethnic and religious cleavages,6 and in the continued maintenance of 
the tragic political divide between Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims, such that the 
narratives of the histories and memories of both the communities are never seen in the 
same frame as the common victims of a state that failed them.7 Instead, the sufferings of 
the Kashmiri Pandits are continually referred to as a justification for colonising and 
dehumanising Kashmiri Muslim bodies. 
Eighthly, the use of humiliation and shame as tools. Honour and shame in patriarchal 
setups are policing mechanisms to control gendered bodies and sexualised identities. In 
cases of rape, it is often the victim and their family who is seen as having suffered 
humiliation. Humiliation is indeed manifestly a political exercise. In the case of Kashmir, 
there is the deliberate humiliation of Kashmiris at every step. The material contours of this 
multifaceted humiliation are evident through the denial of rights to speak, communicate, 
dissent, query, access public services, celebrate festivals, earn livelihoods, and so on. 
However, the symbolic humiliation is no less powerful in how it seeks to legislate and 
erase collective public memory. The symbolic humiliation of individual Kashmiris within 
and outside of Kashmir is routine, such as the beating up of Kashmiri students on Indian 
university campuses or stigmatisation and discrimination when attempting to rent 
accommodation in Indian cities or hotels. Consider the way in which the chosen 
nomenclature of these BJP-manifesto promised 2019 moves proclaimed to inaugurate a 
“New Kashmir” (Naya Kashmir in Hindi), thereby ridiculing the indigenous, non-communal 
and progressive1944 Kashmiri manifesto of the same name (“New Kashmir”/Naya 
Kashmir).8 There were reports that significant public buildings such as the Sher-e-Kashmir 
6 Even prior to August 2019, a divisive politics was in place. Upadhyay (2019) refers to the 
isolation of Kashmir while nurturing Ladakh. However, the August 2019 moves were not 
welcomed in Kargil, a part of Ladakh, see The Wire, 2019b.
7 As Thapar (2019) points out, what happened to Kashmiri Pandits in 1990 in Kashmir is 
remembered, but what happened to Kashmiri Muslims in Jammu in 1947 is forgotten. Kaul 
(2018) refers to her work on the division of the two communities in history and memory 
and the weaponisation of Kashmiri Pandit identity.
8 This manifesto promised abolition of landlordism, schemes for education and health care, 
equal rights for women, concern for civil liberties, among other things. See Ganai (2003).
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Stadium (named after Sheikh Abdullah, “Lion of Kashmir”) in Srinagar will be renamed 
after nationalist figures such as Sardar Patel, who are preferred or appropriated by 
Hindutva.  The very fact that while Kashmiris were suffering distress under a 
communications lockdown, and Indian opposition political figures were denied entry into 
Kashmir, the government in India decided to take a group of far-right European MEPs on a 
tour of the Kashmir Valley (see BBC, 2019b), an example of tactical humiliation in the 
service of Indian coloniality in Kashmir.
Another explicit use of humiliation took place on 5th August 2020 – the first anniversary of 
India’s constitutional coup – when Modi laid a silver brick at the Ram temple site in 
Ayodhya, where an archaeological monument (the Babri Masjid mosque) was demolished 
by militant Hindu vigilantes in 1992. Laying the foundation for it on the exact day that 
Kashmir was dismembered and Kashmiri Muslim aspirations were destroyed in the name 
of development as revenge, indicated intentional, trenchant, and on point symbolism – to 
confirm masculinist possession of a Hindu rashtra/nation over specifically abjected 
Kashmiri Muslims, and Indian Muslims in general (see Kaul 2017, 2020a). Again, through 
the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Order in 2020, the Indian state redefined domicile 
status in Kashmir to extend it to non-Kashmiri residents, who would get a domicile on an 
expedited basis if they were resident in the region for a specific number of years. 
Moreover, on 27 October 2020, new land laws for J&K came into effect, which make it 
possible for any outsider to buy land in Kashmir. The choice of 27th October was 
intentional humiliation too, this being the date in 1947 when Indian troops landed in 
Kashmir Valley and the unrepresentative ruler of Kashmir signed the Instrument of 
Accession; it is commemorated as ‘a black day’ by Kashmiris opposed to Indian 
occupation. 
The features of Indian coloniality in Kashmir I have highlighted here from a feminist 
perspective — consent, paternalism, violence, enforced silencing, unaccountability, 
arbitrariness, divide and rule, and humiliation — that are now ever more conspicuous, are 
underscored by a final feature of a contemporary imperial-colonial project — that frames 
control as a choice between ‘development’ or ‘freedom’; between enhanced economic 
welfare plus well-being aspirations or political and individual rights, where the ‘choice’ is 
forced by the controlling power itself. In patriarchal rape culture, the feminised body has to 
‘choose’ to be either controlled and ‘protected’ by men from other men or assert 
independence and thus be ‘asking for’ sexual and gendered violence.  It is the patriarch 
that often dictates which (non)choice women and other ‘dependents’ ‘have to make’. 
Kashmiri demands for freedom are suppressed in the name of the liberatory rationale of 
development where the course of action is dictated by the colonising state. ‘We must 
liberate you, we must develop you, even if you do not consent to it!’ – this is the mantra of 
colonialism in Kashmir. 
That the mobilisation of development is the most important weapon in the arsenal of 
patriarchal colonial rule, is a postcolonial reality. I now examine this question of what 
‘development’ means for Kashmiris, and how it has been used to enact a coloniality of 
Indian control in Kashmir. This ‘development’ is akin to the ‘white man’s burden’ civilising 
missions of the European colonial period, and is accompanied by orientalist-style 
discourses where Kashmir is exoticised and Kashmiri Muslims are imagined variously as 
excessively religious/ beautiful/ innocent/ corrupt/ traitorous/ different, and thus perfectly 
ripe to be ‘liberated’ by the Indian state from their own excesses. In addition to masculinist 
and militarised nationalism (Enloe, 2000), this idea of ‘liberation’ scavenges upon 
progressive ideas of feminism, LGBTQ rights, and anti-caste struggles and uses them to 
gain rhetorical strength but it is never more than a patriarchal assertion of proprietorial 
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control over a people that must learn to stop resisting and obey. Econonationalism is 
integral to Indian colonial rule over Kashmiris, especially since the end of the de jure 
statehood in August 2019. 
Econonationalism: What does ‘We will develop Kashmir’ mean?
The language of ‘development’9 is eminently mutable; it carries connotations of 
simultaneous desirability in economic, political, and social domains. And this is why the 
uses of a liberatory rationale of development for the purposes of coloniality in Kashmir can 
be best termed as Econonationalism, which works alongside, and is related to, concepts 
such as homonationalism (Puar, 2007) and femonationalism (Farris, 2017). Here, I provide 
an account of how we might be able to perceive this functioning.
Every one of the egregious violations of the rights of Kashmiris is justified in the name of 
how everything that the masculinist Indian state is doing is ultimately for the ‘good of the 
Kashmiri people themselves’. In a word, it will bring them (the Kashmiris, that is): 
Development. By corollary, it is implied that development is an end that justifies using any 
means; the means to reaching it do not need to be moral, humane, accountable, 
consensual or such. Like any hegemonic narrative, the development narrative on Kashmir 
reconciles multiple contradictions. Those supporting the August 2019 changes aver that 
they acted to remove all backwardnesses in Kashmiri society and economy, and to usher 
in liberatory development.10 Somehow, this development — originating in the deprivation 
of autonomy and statehood, and the continued collective punishment of Kashmiris — 
would create the Panglossian best of all possible worlds. Now, the Kashmiris would have 
economic growth, better standards of living, youth will have opportunities hitherto denied 
by corrupt local elite, the situation of LGBTQ+ minorities would be improved, the condition 
of Dalits would be ameliorated, and quite centrally, women will have more freedom and 
rights.
To unpack the specious logic of such framing, it is important to proceed step-wise. One of 
the first major announcements, within a week following the events of 5 August 2019, was 
made by the Indian industrialist Ambani, who announced the setting up of a “development 
task force” for Kashmir (see Business Today, 2019).11 A further investment Summit was 
planned for October 2019, but then postponed, and subsequently reports surfaced to the 
effect that contracts were being given to Indian rather than Kashmiri companies. With 
Lazreg, one might say “Development today means the establishment of capitalist 
economies” (2002, 134). In Kashmir, 2020 saw further amendments to law and policies 
allowing non-citizens to get a residency-based domicile status on a fast-tracked basis and 
for outsiders to be able to buy land; designation of any area as strategic, thus enabling 
permanent constructions there for the use of the armed forces; plans for building hundreds 
9 Here, I signal the post-development critique that followed Escobar’s (1995) powerful 
deconstruction of the imaginary of development as a chapter in the anthropology of 
modernity. 
10 All this while the moves actually inflicted crippling losses on the economy of Kashmir. A 
report by the Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) assessed the losses to 
Kashmir economy in 4 months after August 2019 at Rs 17,878.18 crores (PTI, 2019). 
11 The next day, a deal was brokered between Ambani’s Reliance and Saudi Aramco (See 
Raval and Parkin, 2019). The Economic Times reported on 16 August 2019 that in two 
days since August 12th 2019 AGM, Ambani’s wealth went up by $4 billion (Rs 28,684 
crore).
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of thousands of different dwellings under the changed housing and urban development 
policy. Kashmiris fear that all these changes taken together will result in overwhelming 
demographic change and outsider settlements.12 
It is perfectly possible to have even increased economic growth (higher GDP) alongside 
increased joblessness, widening inequalities, environmental destruction and pollution, and 
poorer quality of life. Development, quite literally, refers to an improvement in the quality of 
life that people are leading as measured by various different indicators. In this sense, it 
has been pointed out by many, including the economist Jean Dreze, that the socio-
economic indicators for Jammu and Kashmir are much better than many Indian states, 
including PM Modi’s home state of Gujarat (see Vincent, 2019). Workers from many Indian 
states seasonally migrate to Kashmir to earn a livelihood. Beggary and homelessness of 
the kind ubiquitous in India, is rare in Kashmir. What the promised economic growth might 
mean in the context of Kashmir, is more likely to be high-risk-high-return investments in 
selected sectors of a corrupt conflict economy with possibly irreversible and damaging 
impact on forestry, land, and natural resources;13 this should internationally be a prime 
concern owing to many transborder dimensions the high altitude ecosystem. This is in 
addition to the pre-existing land grabs in a conflict zone (Suhail, 2018).
Next, it is thoroughly problematic to justify the deprivation of collective Kashmiri freedoms 
through appeal to LGBTQ+ rights. The prevalence of homophobia is a shared feature of 
Kashmiri and wider Indian societies, and there must be every effort to combat this, 
including by supporting the LGBTQ+ community individuals and organisations in Kashmir. 
It was only recently that homosexuality was decriminalised in India, and the Supreme 
Court judgement on Article 377 is applicable to J&K as well. The present actions, colonial 
as they are, appeared to be premised upon an understanding that the LGBTQ+ Kashmiris 
are somehow not also Kashmiri individuals. They ignore the detrimental impact of state-
imposed siege on LGBTQ+ Kashmiris (see Bhat, 2019). In seeking to justify Indian 
oppression through the claim to liberate a marginalised Kashmiri minority (for an example 
of this, see OpIndia, 2019), this becomes an instance of homonationalism (for an undoing 
of this fabricated link, see Gawande, 2019 and Upadhyay, 2020). The central dynamic in 
using the rights of sexual minorities to oppress others rests upon the idea of what Butler 
(2008) terms a ‘presumptive modernity’, and the Indian position illustrates this well. In the 
Indian context, instances of homonationalism are witnessed not in the state’s own rhetoric 
but amongst nationalists who seek to represent the state as progressive despite it being 
staunchly regressive and conservative Hindu nationalist. 
Analogously, some held that the removal of statehood was necessary in order to remove 
the privileges of the Kashmiri ‘state subjects’, which made others such as the landless 
labour and Dalits unable to secure similar livelihoods. This assumption of backward 
Kashmiri society requiring liberation by a progressive modern Indian state ignores the 
history of progressivism and contestations within Kashmir itself. For instance, in the early 
12 In November 2019, the Indian Consul General in New York was filmed at an event as he 
compared the return of Kashmir’s Hindu minority to Israeli settlements (“If the Israeli 
people can do it, we can also do it”, see Express News Service 2019). 
13 Parvaiz, 2019a, reports that “J&K administration has stepped up efforts to create ‘land 
banks’ for investors from outside Kashmir Valley. Over 7% of government-owned land in 
the valley has already been identified for this purpose: 15,000 acres out of 203,020. Most 
of the plots identified are in the floodplains of or adjacent to rivers, streams and wetlands”. 
See also Parvaiz, 2019b.
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1950s, important land reforms were carried out in Kashmir that were far more progressive 
and extensive than in India. Kumar, 2019, quotes R. K. Kalsotra (member of the All India 
Confederation of SC, ST, OBC, J&K, who has worked for the rights of the Scheduled 
Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Other Backward Classes communities since 1990), thus: “The 
government of Hindustan is targeting the people of Jammu and Kashmir by placing the 
gun on the shoulders of Dalit, Adivasi and OBC people”. The siege imposed by the state in 
August 2019 had devastating effects across society, causing staggering in/direct losses to 
the economy of J&K. It is the marginalised and impoverished who have likely borne the 
disproportionate brunt of intentional immiserisation. 
Finally, nowhere else is the implication of the liberation rationale of development as linked 
into the coloniality of India in Kashmir, as in the question of gender, and more specifically, 
Kashmiri women. Any colonial move in the name of the nation is always deeply imbricated 
in subjugating the Other through the gendered exercise of hierarchical power. An 
argument widely heard in the Indian public sphere following August 2019 was that what 
had been done to Kashmir was in order to enhance the rights and freedoms of Kashmiri 
women.14 It was (inaccurately) claimed that Kashmiri women who marry non-Kashmiri men 
lose their state subject status. This restriction, though originally present, was struck down 
in the judgement of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court on ‘State and Others versus 
Susheela Sahni’ inheritance case of 7 October 2002 (see Qureshi, 2019). The reason for 
this, as for the provision of the ‘state subject’ as an entity, was, and has always been, to 
prevent changes to the economic and demographic character of the state, whose 
accession to the Indian Union was linked to the conduct of a plebiscite, which was never 
carried out. Of essence is the fact that Kashmir is a political dispute; indeed, it was one of 
the first international issues that the UN was comprehensively involved in during the 
middle decades of the twentieth century. Instead of the stop-and-start bilateral attempts to 
resolve it as were carried out by previous regimes with varying levels of success, the 
present Indian regime, emboldened by its second win in General Elections, is acting 
straightforwardly upon the Hindutva dream for the region (Kaul, 2019b). 
The patriarchal state’s claim to women’s empowerment is not new. Mushtaq and Bukhari, 
2018, have provided a sharp critique of the ways in which women’s empowerment is being 
used by the state in Kashmir. They ask, “An important ethical question, then, is: how can 
the same state that employs violence, denies justice, kills, blinds, and rapes with impunity, 
claim to be empowering people in general and women in particular?” (87). They argue that 
in the manner of colonial narratives, the empowerment of women is used by the Indian 
state to hide the violations and paper over the question of legitimacy. Indeed, feminism, 
like other progressive ideologies, is open to being subverted in content while being 
deployed in name. 
If, for decades, Kashmir was claimed in the name of democracy, now, it has been 
colonised in the name of development. None of the liberatory developmental rationales of 
economic and social welfare or amelioration of the rights of sexual, economic, and gender 
minorities hold up to scrutiny, or justify the multidimensional collective punishment, rights 
abuses, and continued oppression. In fact, much of the ‘liberation talk’ remains at the level 
of rhetoric deployed by defenders of the government and does not even filter through to 
policy formulation. As India moved in Kashmir in August 2019, and Kashmiris were 
14 This echoes the rationale used by the British to deny self-rule to Indians. See Aggarwal 
(2002, pp. 75, 84) for previous feminist critiques of colonial rule: “The British used ‘the 
woman question’ to argue that Indian society was incapable of self-rule”.
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silenced en masse, numerous Indians celebrated their ‘ownership’ of Kashmir, Kashmiri 
women and/as property. 
Even Indian commentators noticed this, for instance, “In most tweets and posts, Indians 
seem to be equating property with women” (Mukherjee, 2019). One particularly troubling 
reason for the celebration amongst the backers of this move, was that they would now be 
able to “marry fair-skinned Kashmiri women”. Ruling BJP MLA Vikram Singh Saini 
(Bharatiya Janata Party, Member of Legislative Assembly) from India’s most populous 
state of Uttar Pradesh, was filmed making the remarks at a rally that “BJP workers were 
‘excited’ by the change as they can now marry ‘fair girls from Kashmir’” (The Wire, 2019c). 
In fact, Scroll, 2019b, reported that a whole new sub-genre of songs emerged in India 
about getting Kashmiri bahus (daughters-in-law) and buying land in the Valley. Indian 
state’s political move thus resonated with the creation and consolidation of sexualised and 
gendered fantasies. Kaul (2018) theorises this longstanding Indian obsession with Kashmir 
through a feminist analysis focusing on the discourses of representation, cartography and 
possession – the ‘exotic’ Kashmiri women, Kashmir as the head of the geo-body of 
‘Mother India’, and feminised understanding of possession and control of Kashmiri bodies 
to bring order to the troubled ‘marital relationship’ between India and Kashmir. 
The nationalist project in India, as elsewhere, is deeply gendered, and the Hindu 
nationalist project of the BJP on Kashmir is filled with contradictions in how it combines 
coloniality with social conservatism as well as the language of liberation (on various 
aspects, see Kaul and Zia, 2018; Mushtaq, 2019; Naqvi, 2019; Dhar, 2019). Astoundingly, 
BJP legislator and supporters marched in support of the Hindu right-wing rapists of the 
eight-year-old girl Asifa Bano in 2018 in Kathua, Jammu. Soon thereafter, at a festival 
celebrating the Hindu epic of the Ramayana in September 2019, citing the Hindu epic 
Ramayana, the Indian Home Minister Amit Shah said: “How is a woman’s honour 
protected… Those who understand the horrors of war and its devastating consequences 
also say that when a woman’s honour is lost, the state is lost, culture is lost. That’s why if a 
war is necessary to protect a woman’s honour, it must be fought” (see Pandey, 2019). 
Violence and control in the name of the ‘protection’ of women is part of patriarchal rape 
cultures and masculinist nationalisms. 
Despite the overwhelming acceptance within India of the right-wing government’s 
constitutional coup in Kashmir, the fact remains that the move is part of a toxic nationalism 
that operates with an often violently and coercively enforced Hindu supremacism making 
political use of religion, along with hypocritical doubletalk on gender, comprised of the 
usual discourse of liberating women and the fantasies of possessing women as property. 
The aim is to realise the dream of a Hindu nation for the supporters of such a project, and 
to deliver economic exploitation by way of resource grabs for its crony backers,15 in this 
case by treating Kashmir as real estate and as unpeopled. 
Why does econonationalist development function as a successful mode of 
coloniality in Kashmir?
In the contemporary post-August 2019 phase, it has become clear that ‘development’ can 
successfully be mobilised to entrench an occupation; every indicator seems to point to the 
destruction of the economy and livelihoods that came about as a result of this ostensibly 
15 The wealth of Modi’s biggest corporate backers, the industrialists Ambani and Adani, 
has doubled under his rule; for more, see Varma, 2019.
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development-promoting move. Once we are able to perceive the ways in which the 
rhetoric of development can be, and has been, used to justify the exercise of power as 
coloniality in Kashmir, we must ask why ‘development’ functions as a successful mode of 
coloniality in the face of enough empirical evidence that demonstrates the oppressions and 
dehumanisations carried out in its name? In other words, what underpins the appeal of 
econonationalism? 
I want to offer brief conceptual, ideological and historical explanations here. Namely, that 
development has come to be understood as an transitive verb, it is something done to 
people to address their (often feminised) Othered, forever-lack, rather than something 
done by them; that it functions as an apolitical marker while being thoroughly ideological in 
how it separates political from the economic realm; and that it has been entrenched 
through institutions and powerful global and national actors serving historical and 
contemporary imperial-colonial projects that have validated oppressions in its name.
Firstly, conceptually, the dominant way in which development is seen ever more, is, as a 
transitive verb — as something that is done to someone, and so much not done by them 
(see Arndt, 1981). Hence, we have the idea of bringing development to a place or a 
people. Further, implied within the idea of such development is a teleology; the rhetoric of 
development constructs it as something that progressively unfolds in a hierarchical manner 
(from those who are more developed to those who are less-developed) in order to address 
an always-already forever-lack. In both of these senses, the imaginary is that of an Other 
is always backward (constructed as uncivilised, feminised, impoverished, in need of 
guidance and instruction) and a potential beneficiary of the liberation that development will 
bring in whatever manner, and through whatever means that might need to be endured to 
reach the desired goal of achieving development.
Secondly, ideologically, development is seen as an all-round panacea; something that is a 
precursor to purported peace and end of conflict, in and of itself, because it is somehow 
apolitical. For instance, the problematic link that is made between impoverishment and 
political radicalisation in Kashmir in the simplistic terms that if Kashmiri youth were 
educated and well-off, their political aspirations for freedom or the end of Indian occupation 
would vanish. This is not borne out in reality. However, it is a persuasive construct 
because it presents a facile hope out of a conflicted and unending imbroglio. By 
transferring the question of politics of freedom onto a circumstantial terrain, and by 
functioning as an ostensibly apolitical referent, the idea of development holds out the 
promise that economic growth (even if it were realisable under the present circumstances 
in Kashmir) is the same as development, and thus seeks to depoliticise the fundamentally 
political questions of freedom, value, work and reward (Kaul, 2007).
Thirdly, historically, as a result of the long-standing history of Bretton Woods institutions 
and the successful invention of development as the new civilising mission (in the 
Foucaultian sense of ‘useful delinquency’, one that permits intervention) in the post-
Second World War era, development (like democracy in its procedural, as opposed to 
substantive, sense) has been a valuable weapon in the arsenal of profitable commercial 
and military interventions that speak to (trans)national interests. Notwithstanding the 
attempts by China, at the behest of Pakistan, to raise the Kashmir issue in the UN Security 
Council, the current Indian moves in Kashmir echo not just the historical colonialism of the 
British Empire, but also the contemporary Chinese establishment of control over Tibet and 
Xinjiang through infrastructure, demographic and other economic changes (see Kaul, 
2020b). The fact that these and other moves have been successful geopolitically through 
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validation by powerful international states, does not (and should not) obfuscate the denial 
of rights and freedoms that they involve. 
Conclusion
By way of conclusion, I would like to put forth a few thoughts. It is worth wondering that if 
the oft-repeated statement that ‘Kashmir is an integral part of India’ is the answer, then 
what is the question? Only a situation of coloniality can assert such a stake-claiming 
answer in a context of disputed relationality. A careful look at the history of the region 
would make clear the legal claims of those speaking the name of the entity “Kashmir”. At 
present, the vital link between state and statistics is enacted through the necropolitical16 
arithmetic enabled by the use/deployment of terror as a master narrative. It is impossible 
to ignore the entrenched use of arbitrary power to enact different modalities of killing 
Kashmiris by a patriarchal masculinist colonial state. 
At the time of this writing, the future outcomes in the region are held hostage to the playing 
out of a tactical gambit with a bet on different combinations of indignation and resignation. 
It is deemed acceptable to do this precisely because Kashmiri lives and aspirations do not 
matter in these calculations. While claiming to bring liberatory and multidimensional 
development to Kashmir, the post-August 2019 period has witnessed the wilful imposition 
of destitution upon Kashmiris by a conscious crippling of the economy of Kashmir, 
economic violence, genocidal fears, and the creation of continued debility, while deploying 
the rhetoric of liberation and development for all, but specifically for women, LGBTQ+ 
people, and minorities. All of this relies upon the perpetuation of sustained divides 
amongst Kashmiris of different regions and religions, media limitations, suppression of 
dissent and free speech by intimidation and violence, and the lack of systematic 
knowledge and wider understanding of Kashmir as a political dispute. If these be the facts 
of the matter, then let us call econonationalism and other discourses serving an 
occupation by their true name – coloniality.
16 I use necropolitical here in the sense of Mbembe, 2003. 
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